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Huemoeller: Wyoming's Uniform Trustee's Powers Act: A Help to the Knowledgabl

WYOMING'S UNIFORM TRUSTEE'S POWERS ACT:
A HELP TO THE KNOWLEDGABLE DRAFTSMAN,
A TRAP FOR THE UNWARY
The trustee, at common law, had no powers solely by virtue of his office.' His only powers were those which were
granted to him expressly or impliedly by the terms of the
trust instrument.2 The implied powers are those that are
necessary and appropriate for the carrying out of the trust's
purpose and are not expressly forbidden by the terms of the
trust instrument. 3 If for some reason, a power that was
necessary for the administration of the trust was omitted
from the instrument, the trustee had to seek judicial approval before he could exercise such power.4 To avoid such
problems draftsmen had to have a solid background in archaic rules which made little sense in the mid-twentieth century, as well as an exceptional ability to foresee problems in
the future.5 To complicate matters further, courts have tended to narrowly construe the powers granted to the trustee.6
Perhaps the reason for these strict rules is that the
trustee is a fiduciary of the highest character and consequently the potential for him to cause harm is very great.
The fact is, that today trusts are generally created for the investment and active management of a fund. The modern
trust has greatly changed in both purpose and character
from that of its forebearers. In the 18th century the purpose
of the trust was mainly to keep family landholdings intact,
and thus, the trustee's role was passive.' The modern trust is
often made up of securities which require constant attention
by the trustee so that maximum economic benefit is
achieved, both in terms of safety and yield. Also, a desire for
tax benefits has resulted in the use of discretionary powers
to a degree unprecedented in the previous centuries.'
Consequently, the settlor, or the creator of the trust, intends the trustee to have all powers needed for efficient and
Copyright ©1979 by the University of Wyoming.
1. Haskell, Some Problems With the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act; 32
TEMPORARY PROBLEMS,

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

LAW AND CON-

168, 169 (1967).

Fratcher, Trustees'Powers Legislation, 37 N. Y. UNIv. L. REV., 627 (1962).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 186 (1959).
Note, Utah's Trustees'Powers Provisions, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 265 (1977).
Fratcher, supra note 5, at 627.
Horowitz, Uniform Trustees'Powers Act, 41 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1966).
Id. at 1-2.
Hallgring, The Uniform Trustees'Powers Act and the Basic Principlesof Fiduciary
Responsibility, 41 WASH. L. REV. 801, 823 (1966).
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economical management. 9 The need for more skillful management of the trust corpus has also resulted in a change in
the character of the trustee. The trusted friend acting as a
fiduciary has given way, in many instances, to a corporate
trustee, such as a trust department of a bank, that has the
skill and manpower to properly handle the estate.
In order to accomplish the results desired in using a
modern trust, revisions in the law as it had developed in the
courts was needed. 10 One of the first really successful
statutory modifications was the enactment of the "prudent
man" rule for investments. This rule broadened the list of
eligible investments the trustee could make." It enabled the
trustee to purchase corporate stocks and bonds, investments
which had previously been forbidden in some states unless
authorized by the terms of the trust. 2 A second, and
somewhat more sweeping revision, is represented by the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, enacted in Wyoming in
1965."
The act liberalizes the strict rules of the common law, by
giving the trustee power to perform every act a prudent man
would perform in carrying out the purposes of the trust. The
act further grants specific powers which had not existed at
common law absent express provisions in the trust instrument.'4 The statute is a useful and needed tool in modern
trust law, but it has been severely criticized for removing
some basic restraints that had been placed on trustees because of the experiences of courts in dealing with them. In
particular, these restraints were based on the fiduciary's
duty of loyalty, of care and the duty not to delegate discretionary powers. 5 The purpose of this article is to discuss this
act, first concentrating on its general provisions, and then,
exposing some of its dangers.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Fratcher, supra note 2, at 658.
Horowitz, supra note 6, at 4.
The prudent man rule was enacted in Wyoming in 1967. See WYo. STAT. § 4-3-101
thru 105 (1977).
The New York Supreme Court in King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869), held that the investments by the trustee in stocks of various corporations was improper. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 227, comment M (1959).
WYo. STAT. § 4-8-101 thru 110 (1977). In the discussion I will refer to the section
number used in the Uniform Trustee's Powers Act. The Wyoming act follows the
same order.
Note, Utah's Trustees' Powers' Provisions, supra note 4, at 265.
Hallgring, supra note 8, at 802.
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THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

This section gives a brief discussion of the various sections of the act, noting particularly those areas in which
there has been a change from the common law. The first section of the act'6 defines various terms as they are used in the
act. Subsection 1 limits the act to only those trusts in which
the trustee administers the assets for the benefit of income
or principal beneficiaries. Then follows a careful listing of the
types of trusts which are not included, such as resulting or
constructive trusts, investment trusts and voting trusts to
name a few. In essence then, the act applies only to inter
vivos and testamentary private trusts and charitable trusts.
Subsection (b) of the act's second section, 7 however, allows
the act to be incorporated by reference into instruments
which are not trusts. Testators and their lawyers may find
this a useful tool in granting powers to the administrators of
their estates.' 8
In subsection 2(a)19 the act makes clear that it has
changed the common law rule which held that absent express and implied powers granted in the trust instrument
the trustee has no powers at all.20 Instead, now the trustee
has powers simply by virtue of his office, whether the trust
instrument grants him any or not. Thus, the act requires
that the settlor negate certain broad powers if he does not intend them to exist.2 This power to limit certain provisions of
the act is itself restricted by the idea that certain powers and
rights cannot be negated without destroying parts essential
to the operation of the statute.2"
Section (3)a 2" of the act, is a broad grant of general powers to the trustee to do anything that a prudent man would.
The section specifically provides that the powers granted are
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

WYo. STAT. § 4-8-101 (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 4-8-102(b) (1977).
Horowitz, supra note 6, at 1.
WYo. STAT. § 4-8-102(a) (19771.
Fratcher, supra note 2, at 627; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186 (1959).
Haskell, supra note 1,at 169; UTPA § 2(a) provides that "(t)he trustee has all the
powers conferred upon him by the provisions of this act unless limited in the trust
instrument."
In particular Charles Horowitz, chairman of the committee drafting the act, stated
that "a provision excluding the operation of § 7 would be inoperative as violative of
the basic purposes of the Act." Horowitz, supra note 6, at 13.
WYo. STAT. § 4-8-103(a) (1977).
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in addition to those enumerated elsewhere in the act.24 The
act defines a prudent man as a trustee who exercises trust
powers in a reasonable and prudent manner based on how
men of ordinary prudence, diligence and judgment act in
managing their own affairs.2" This definition of "prudent
man" is taken from the prudent man rule of investment
law,26 a standard first set out by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in HarvardCollege v. Amory. 17 It has also been used to
govern the trustee's general duty of care and skill in managing the trust estate. 8 The rule changes the common law by
giving the trustee the power to perform any act necessary to
accomplish the purposes of the trust even though the power
was not expressly conferred. However, it is not a blank
check, since he can only use such powers as are necessary to
perform his fudiciary duties.29 The trustee does not have the
power to do things his duty of care prohibits him from
doing.1
Section 3(b)2 ' limits the powers granted by the act so
that any available tax exemptions will not be lost. The purpose is to preclude acts which would cause trusts such as
charitable trusts, grantor trusts and marital deduction
trusts, to lose their tax exempt status. It is not meant to
restrict action merely because the trust might be taxed in
some way. Thus the trustee may acquire an asset that might
create a tax liability for the trust as long as other existing
tax exemptions of the trust are not lost. 2 The line between
the two may be difficult to draw. 3
The specific grants of power to the trustees are listed in
section 3(c).3 Subsection 3(c)1 generally follows the common
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Horowitz, supra note 6, at 13.
WYo. STAT. § 4-8-101(3) (1977).
Horowitz. supra note 6, at 10.
26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 461 (1830).
"All that can be required of a trustee to invest is,that he shall conduct himself
faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation,
but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considerinF the probable
income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.'
2 ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 174 (2nd Ed. 1967). See also, Dallas Dome Wyoming
Oil Fields Co. v. Broder. 55 Wyo. 109, 97 P.2d 311 (19 ) where the Wyoming
Supreme Court held that the standard of care and diligence required of a trustee was
that of a man of ordinary prudence and skill in the management of his own estate.
Horowitz, supra note 6, at 11.
Haskell. supra note 1,at 172.
WYo. STAT. § 4-8-103(b) (1977).
Horowitz, supra note 6, at 15.
Haskell. supra note 1, at 181.
WYO. STAT. § 4-8-103(c) (1977).
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law except that it allows the trustee to retain an asset in
which he is personally interested. Previous law had held that
the trustee could never allow himself to be placed in a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty
to the beneficiary." Thus, it was held that a trustee was
under a duty to dispose of its own shares if retention was not
authorized by the terms of the trust.", One of the results of
this change is that a corporate trustee is free to retain stock
in itself as a trust asset, subject only to the rules of prudence.
Section 3(c)3 also represents a break with the law. Without such a section a trustee could not carry on an active business unless the term of the trust so provided or a court authorized such activity. 7 As with all the enumerated powers,
the trustee can conduct the business only if it is prudent
with respect to both the preservation of principal and the
production of income.
Section 3(c)6 changes the rule that a bank, acting as
trustee, cannot deposit trust funds in its own banking department. The reason for the rule was that the deposit
amounted to self-dealing by the trustee. 3 The drafters of the

act have expressed the opinion that "(a) savings and loan
association39 is not necessarily a branch within the meaning of
this rule."

The next section involves a radical departure from the
common law. The rules changed are the power to sell, either
for cash or on credit, to improve, to partition, to exchange, to
change the character of the trust estate and to encumber
mortgage or pledge, and to do so beyond the terms of the
trust if such is desired. Prior to the enactment of this act,
power to sell depended on the terms of the trust or on the
fact that the sale was necessary and appropriate to carry out
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

2 A. SCOTT, supra note 28, § 170.
Id. at § 170.15.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 230, comment M (1959).
Id. at § 170 comment M. WYo. STAT. § 13-5-109 (1977) appears to conflict with § 3(c)6
of the UTPA in that the former says such funds may only be deposited in the bank's
commercial department if proper security is pledged for the deposit. To the extent
that the funds are insured by the federal government no such security is required.
The Uniform Act provided for the possibility that a state might not want certain
statutes affected by this Act. The Wyoming act failed to utilize this and thus, there
is the ambiguity. It would'seem that a ".prudent" corporate trustee would follow the
stricter rule to avoid any problems.
Horowitz, supra note 6, at 19.
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the purpose of the trust. 40 Even if the power of sale was
found to exist, either expressly or impliedly, it was not construed, generally, to include power to sell on credit, to exchange or to partition. 41 In addition, implied power to mortgage was rarely found except where such was necessary to
carry out the purposes of the trust. 42 The same reasoning applied to the incurring of expenses for purposes of improvements to the trust estate. 3 The trustee has always been
authorized to make repairs, as permitted in Section 3(c)8,
by allowing
although the act expands the power somewhat
44
such expenses even for extraordinary repairs.
Subsection 3(c)10 deals with the power of the trustee to
give or enter into leases. Even without the act, the trustee is
normally held to have the power to lease trust land because
such power is necessary to fulfill his duty to make the trust
estate productive.4 5 The length of time for which a lease was
made had to be reasonable under the circumstances, but
rarely was the trustee justified in making a lease for a period
longer than the period of the trust. 6 The section clearly
changes that rule. It also changes the rule that the trustee is
not empowered to grant an option, even though he may have
the power to lease. 7 Similarly, Section 3(c)12 allows the
trustee to grant an option to purchase even without the
lease. It also, further allows the trustee to take an option for
the acquiring of an asset.
Power to enter into leases for exploring or removing
minerals or other natural resources is granted by subsection
3(c)11. Prior to this, the general rule was that the trustee's
power depended on whether oil and gas wells or mines had
been opened on the land.48 This rule, however, was not generally followed where both the life estate and the remainder
interests were held in trust. 9 This subsection clears up any
doubts the trustee might have, although power to enter into
a lease had probably already existed statutorily in Wyo40.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 190 (1959).

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Fratcher, supra note 2, at 632.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 191 comment b (1959).
Fratcher, supra note 2, at 630.
Horowitz, supra note 6, at 19; 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 13, at § 188.2.
3 ScoTT, supra note 28, at § 189.
Id. at § 189.2.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 190 comment k (1959).
3 ScoTT, supro note 28, at § 189.7.
2 WILLIAMS & MYERS, OIL & GAS LAW, § 514 (1977).
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ming.5 0 Problems with creation of reserves for remainder
men are dealt with by subsection 3(c)21 and the Wyoming
Uniform Income and Principal Act which provides a formula
for the division of the proceeds.5 1 The power to lease,
however, should rarely be construed to justify a trustee in
taking the risks of exploring for minerals even though section 3(c)3 allows him to conduct a business. 2
Subsection 3(c)16 allows title to trust property to be
taken in the name of third persons or in any other manner,
including the trustee's name, without earmarking the property as a trust investment. Earmarking was strictly required
at common law. 3 The use of nominees was also forbidden,
even if the trust property was earmarked. 4 The reason for
the rule was the possibility that without earmarking the
trustee at a subsequent time, would be able to contend that
the investments which had proved profitable were his own,
while those which had resulted in a loss were the trusts.5 A
second purpose was to put third party purchaser's on notice
that they were dealing with trust property and therefore
they were obligated to inquire into whether the trustee had
power to sell the assets. This made sales of securities, in particular, quite difficult, and thus, statutes have been enacted
which provide that securities of a trust may be held by
nominees.5" Generally, these statutes applied only to corporate trustees and therefore this section extends the law by
granting all trustees this power.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 191 (2) the trustee could not borrow on the credit of the
trust estate unless the terms of the trust granted him such
power. 7 Subsection 3(c)18 changes this rule so that the
trustee now can borrow on the trust's credit. It further
assumes that the trustee can advance money to the trust
and that he has a lien on the assets of the trust for such adWYO. STAT. § 4-5-103 (1977). The section requires court approval and it does not appear to apply at all to inter vivos trusts. It may not apply to testamentary trusts
either once the probate proceedings have ended.
51. WYo. STAT. § 4-8-109 (1977).
52. Note, Utah's Trustee's Powers Provisions,supra note 4, at 285.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 179, comment d (1959).
54. 2 ScoTT, supra note 28, at § 179.5.
55. 1d. at § 179.3.
56. WYo. STAT. § 13-5-109(c) (1977) provides that trust companies may register trust
securities in the name of a nominee.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 191(2) (1959).
50.
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vancements. This part of the section comports with the common law rule.5 8
Subsection 3(c)20 basically tracks prior law. It deviates
in one respect, however, by allowing the trustee to set his
own compensation. At common law the trustee was entitled
to reasonable compensation." Two methods were used to set
the amount; either a statutory scheme was enacted, or a
court exercised its discretion in fixing the amount.6 0 He was
not permitted to set the amount himself unless a court found
it was reasonable." Although the section speaks only in
terms of paying the compensation, it is generally felt that it
also authorized the fixing of the amount since simple payment is a mechanical act which requires no authorization
once the amount is ascertained.62 It appears that the framers
6
of the act agree with this view. 1
Subsection 3(c)24 is another provision which represents
a broad break with the common law. It expands powers with
respect to the employment of others, power to delegate
discretion to agents and power to act upon an agent's recommendation without independent investigation.6 4 At common
law the trustee could employ agents, if to do so was reasonably necessary for the administration of the trust. He could
not employ agents, however, to do things he personally
should have performed.6" In particular, the trustee could not
delegate acts requiring substantial discretion. 66 The subsection clearly allows the delegation of discretionary acts. The
word "associated" as used in the section seems to indicate
that the trustee employees can be members of his law firm,
other employees of the corporate trustee or brokers in the
trustee's real estate firm. To the extent this involves selfdealing it is also a break with prior law.6 7 The power to delegate is limited by section 468 which prohibits the trustee from
58. Id. at § 244 comment c which provides that "tlo the extent to which the trustee is
entitled to indemnity he has a security interest in the trust property.
59. Horowitz, supra note 6, at 23.
60. 3 SCOTT, supra note 28, at § 242.
61. Id. at § 242.2.
62. Hallgring, supra note 8. at 817.
63. See Horowitz, supra note 6, at 23 where he says that "at common law... [compensation] could not be fixed by the trustee himself. This subsection changes that rule
subject to fiduciary accountability.
64. Id. at 24.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS. § 188 comment c (1959).
66. 2 SCOTT, supra note 28, at § 171.2.
67. Haskell, supra note 1. at 177.
68.

WYO. STAT. § 4-8-104 (1977).
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transferring his office or the entire administration of the
trust to another.
Section 5(a) is intended to continue the rule that a court
of equity can empower a trustee to do an act expressly prohibited by the terms of the trust, if because of circumstances
not known to the settlor when the trust was created and not
anticipated by him, failure to do so would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the
trust. 9 Even though the section was an attempt to continue
the existing rules of law on augmentation, the drafters of the
act felt that the principles of liberality written into it would
encourage courts to remove trust restrictions when the rule
of prudence required. 0 Subsection 5(b) limits the power of
trustees to act where there is a conflict of interest by requiring court approval. 71 Certain sections which expressly allow
for self-dealing are excluded from the operations of this provision.
Section 6(a) changes the common law rule that two or
more trustees can exercise power only by unanimous
action.72 The rule was relaxed in cases of emergencies and
with charitable trusts where a majority would exercise the
powers of the trustee. This section extends the principal of
allowing the majority to exercise the trust powers to all
trusts covered by the act.
One of the more important changes effected by the act is
in section 7, dealing with the duty of inquiry of third parties.
The problems in dealing with third parties arise because the
trustee holds legal title to the trust property and thus, he
can transfer it with the same effect on legal title as if he were
the beneficial owner of the property.73 Thus, the trustee
would pass legal title to a third party even though the terms
of the trust did not authorize him to do such. Of course, he
would be liable for breach of trust. If the third party had no
notice that the trustee was exceeding the scope of his powers, and gave value, equitable title would pass as well. 14 The
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §

Horowitz, supra note 6, at 26.
Id.
Fratcher, supra note 2, at 637.
Id. at 645.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS,

167(1) 11959); Horowitz, supra note 6, at 25

§ 284 (1959).
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requirement of lack of notice was difficult to fulfill since
anyone who had actual or imputed notice that he was dealing with a trustee was required to make diligent inquiry into
the trustee's powers, and he is charged with knowledge of
what he would have found.75 This rule of inquiry was bolstered by the requirement that trustees segregate trust property and earmark it. 7"
The Trustees Power Act eliminates the imputed notice
and the duty to inquire into the powers of the trustee. Instead, the third party can assume that the trustee has the
power to act and that he is properly exercising each power
unless the third party has actual notice that such is not the
case. As long as there is no actual notice, the third party is
fully protected. This elimination of the duty of inquiry
creates a problem inside the act itself. It involves subsection
2(a) and the question of whether the settlor can limit the
operation of this section in the trust instrument so as to
restore the duty of inquiry. This would mean that a third person dealing with a trustee would always have to examine the
trust instrument to see if section 7 had been excluded. Since
this would totally defeat the purpose of the section, it was
felt by the drafters of the act that such an exclusion would be
ineffective."
THE PITFALLS OF THE ACT

The Uniform Trustees Powers Act, like any provision
which effected so many changes in the law, has been subject
to criticism. While some of it may be unjustified, much of it
has merit and therefore this section will examine some of the
more objectionable provisions. It is important to remember
that if these or any other provisions of the Act disturb the
drafter of a trust instrument, section 2(a) allows him to limit
the effectiveness of that provision.
In certain respects, however, the act provides greater
freedom of action to a trustee than is really necessary for
sound management.7 8 One commentator has suggested that
75.

76.
77.
78.

Fratcher, supra note 2, at 645; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
f-N
(1959).
Fratcher, supra note 2, at 645.
Horowitz, supra note 6, at 29.
T. SHAFFER, TilE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND
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some of the liberalizing provisions of the statute seem
designed to exculpate the fiduciary or put him at an advantage.79 In fact, it is often the corporate fiduciary that has
pushed for the enactment of legislation such as the Uniform
Trustees' Powers Act.5 0 Without doubt, certain basic restraints felt necessary in the past to protect the beneficiaries
have been weakened. In particular these restraints are the
duty of loyalty, the duty of care or skill, and the duty not to
delegate discretionary powers."1 Although the act deals with
powers, the trustee's duties are relevant since he cannot
have the power to do something which his fiduciary duties
would forbid.2
The Duty of Care and Skill
The prudent man rule of sections 1(3) and 3(a) establishes the duty of care and skill that is required of the
trustee. The standard established is the same one used with
investment powers. Nevertheless, it fails to provide sufficient protection to the beneficiaries and the trust estate
because it requires that the trustee uses only the caution and
expertise he would use in managing his own property.83 This
comports with the standard used by the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,84 but some states including Utah, have taken
a different approach. Utah adopted the majority of the provisions of the Uniform Trustees Powers Act, but it changed
the prudent man rule. It holds a trustee to the standard of
care observed by prudent men dealing with the property of
another.8 5 It is possible there is little or no difference in the
two standards, 6 but some courts have distinguished them,
because the latter standard recognizes that a trustee is not
empowered to take the same risks with trust property that
he would take with his own even if the ventures he would invest in himself are good business risks. 7
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

85.

86.
87.

Haskell, supra note 1, at 168.
Id. The author expresses the view that this is especially true with bank fiduciaries.
Hallgring, supra note 8, at 802.
Haskell, supra note 1, at 172.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS. § 174 (1959).
Note, Utah's Trustees'PowersProvisions,supra note4, at 271-2. UTAh CODE ANN.§
75-7-302 (1978) provides that "the trustee shall observe the standards in dealing
with trust assets that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another.
2 SCOTT, supra note 28. at § 174.
King v. Talbot. supra note 12, at 86. The New York Court held. "It, therefore, does
not follow, that because prudent men may and often do, conduct their own affairs
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A second, and even more serious, failing of the act's prudent man rule is that it fails to hold trustees who have or
represent themselves to have greater skills than the average
fiduciary to a higher standard. Usually it is the corporate
trustee who falls into this category of fiduciary. The standard used by the Act results in the protection of the bank
fiduciary at the expense of sound trust management.88 This
is a marked liberalization of prior law which recognized that
a trustee who had, or represented himself as having, higher
skills was obligated to exercise those skills. 9 Even agents
are required to use their actual skills when they are
superior." The Utah prudent man provision adopts the rule
of prior law to an extent. It distinguishes between the professional trustee and the ordinary trustee by requiring those
trustees with special expertise to make use of it.9 '
The Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty has been called the "most fundamental duty owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries of the
trust.2 It is the obligation of a trustee to always act in the interest of the beneficiary and never in his own interest." Dealings between the trustee, acting for himself, and the trust
are not permitted even though they were conducted in good
faith. 4 Section 5(b) of the act requires that the court
authorize any self-dealing between the trust and the trustee.
However, self-dealing authorized by some subsections of the
act are excluded from this provision. Of these subsections,
two, 3(c)1, and 3(c)24, have troubled commentators the most.
In addition, subsection 3(c)20 contains elements of selfdealing which may give problems.
Section 3(c)1 allows retention of assets in which the
trustee is personally interested. This means that a bank actwith the ho e of growing rich, and therein take the hazard of adventures which they
deem hope ul, trustees do the same; the preservation of the fund, and the procurement of a just income therefrom are primary objects of the creation of the trust
itself, and are to be primarily regarded."
88. Haskell, supra note 1, at 172.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 174 (1959).
90. Hallgring, supra note 8, at 829.
91. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-302 (1978). The act says in part that "'ifthe trustee has
special skills or is named trustee on the basis of representations of special skills or
expertise, he is under a duty to use those skills."
92. 2 ScO,
supra note 28, at § 170.
93. Hallgring, supra note 8, at 803.
94. 2 Scoi-r. supra note 28, at § 170.1.
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ing as trustee can hold onto stock in itself. This opens the
possibility of abuse in several ways. The management of the
bank may prefer to retain the stock rather than have it fall
into the hands of hostile parties.9 5 Also the trustee may
desire to retain the stock because he wants the votes that go
with it, since subsection 3(c)13 gives him the power to vote
the trust's stock. Retention of the stock is, in any case, permissible only where a prudent man would do so, but the act
certainly enables the trustee to rationalize more easily his
retention of the stock. It is true in some cases, such as where
the bank is small, where the settlor makes his business partner a trustee or where the shares are a sizeable block of the
company's total shares, retention would be justified for
economic reasons." It has been suggested that this subsection should be rewritten to allow retention only in situations
similar to those just mentioned.9 7
Subsection 3(c)20 represents the most blatant of all selfdealing provisions because it allows the trustee to determine
the amount he should be paid. As mentioned earlier, this section is concerned with more than just the simple payment of
compensation. The provision is flagrantly unjustifiable because it places the burden on the beneficiary to challenge the
reasonableness of the trustee's compensation. 8 The trustee,
of course, is limited by the prudent man rule, but the section
nonetheless accords his judgment a prima facie validity.9 A
possible solution to this problem would be to subject the setting of compensation to either the provisions of section 5(b)
or to a statutory scheme of some sort.
Another example of possible self-dealing allowed by the
act is in subsection 3(c)24. This provision empowers the
trustee to hire people associated with him to assist him in his
duties. It is not certain what "associate" means, but it is
likely to include officers, directors and employees of corporate trustees. 0 ° The problem is, when a settlor entrusts his
estate to a corporate trustee he expects to get, as a matter of
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

HaUgring, supra note 8, at 813.
Haskell, supra note 1, at 174.

Id
Id. at 175. The author notes that it is possible that under section 51b) court
authorization would be needed to set the salary, but he says that such a view is inconsistent with the inclusion of this power specifically in the subsection.
HaUgring, supra note 8. at 818.
[d. at 821.
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course, all the services which the trustee is known to perform
regularly.'0 1 Under prior law it was possible for a trustee to

receive additional compensations for the performance of professional or other services not usually rendered by
trustees.' 2 This may provide a basis for allowing the corporate fiduciary to charge an additional fee for the use of
specialists it has in its employ. But, why should the trust be
charged for the services of an in-house investment specialist,
when the major reason why a corporate trustee was appointed was because the modern trust needs special investment
skill and flexibility?' 3 Although the hiring of an "associate"
is limited by the rule of prudence, again this provision puts
the bank in the driver's seat on close calls. Also, under
subsection 3(c)20 it is permissible for the trustee to determine how much his employees or "associates" should be paid
for the extraordinary services.'0 4
Duty Not to Delegate
Under the prior law the trustee could not delegate to
others acts which he could reasonably be required to perform.'0 5 The duty is based on the concept that a settlor usually selects the trustee, whether individual or corporate,
because of the confidence he has in the trustee, or because of
the fiduciary's reputation."1' When a fiduciary delegates acts
to an agent, he is only liable if he directed the agent to perform the act, or if he was negligent in selecting the agent.' 7
Thus, the trustee substitutes the liability of a stranger for
his own when he delegates, thereby defeating the settlor's
purpose in appointing him. For this reason, the duty not to
delegate was a very important aspect of trust law. Subsection 3(c)24 relaxes the delegation rule by allowing the trustee
to delegate any act of administration and then allowing him
to act on the advise of the agent without any independent investigation. This provision seems to give unwarranted
freedom to a trustee to employ others and then escape liability if the agent's advice on actions were wrong, thus ignoring
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 820.

107.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 242 comment d (1959).

Haskell, supra note 1, at 176.
Hallgring, supra note 8, at 822.
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TRUSTS.

§

171 (1959).

Hallgring, supra note 8, at 832.

§ 225 (1959).
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the special trust and confidence with which the settlor chose
him.
Once again it is the corporate trustee who profits by
these provisions. The bank can either collect a fee from the
trust for delegating certain acts to its own investment advisors, or it can avoid the expense of hiring such advisors by
simply retaining them with trust funds." 8 The abuse possible with this section could be largely avoided if the standard
of prudence took into account the special skill possessed or
represented to be possessed by the fiduciary bank. In the
business of trust administrations a selling point of almost
any corporate fiduciary is that they have the means to assure that the trust assets will be properly invested. With a
standard of prudence based on special skills, it would seem
that the trustee could not delegate or recover additional
compensation for the furnishing of services related to their
skills.
Duty to Earmark
As mentioned earlier, the duty to earmark was strictly
enforced at common law, 10 9 partly to put third party pur-

chasers on notice that they were dealing with trust property.
Subsection 3(c)16 eliminates the need for earmarking. The
rationale for this provision and others like it was to facilitate
the transfer of trust property, particularly securities."' Section 7 allows the third party purchaser to assume the trustee
is acting properly in selling trust assets to him unless he has
actual notice that the trustee is acting beyond his authority.
Also, section 8-304 and 8-403 of the Uniform Commercial
Code"' similarly protect a third party who is a good faith
purchaser of trust securities.
What these provisions mean is that there is no longer
any duty of inquiry on the third party just because he knows
of the trust character of the property he is purchasing. Consequently, earmarking would not affect sales of trust property, including securities and therefore, some commentators
108.

Haskell, supra note 1, at 177.

109.

See, note 50, supra.

110.

Horowitz, supra note 6, at 21.
WYo. STAT. § 34-21-843(b), 872 (1977).1

111.
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have suggested that the act should have retained the duty of
earmarking. "'
USING THE UNIFORM TRUSTEES POWER ACT

The most important point to remember when using the
act is that the trustee automatically has the powers enumerated in it. It becomes part of every trust. Thus, it is imperative that the drafter of the trust instrument have a thorough understanding of the act and its strengths and weaknesses. In each case the drafter should examine the powers
to determine whether they are adequate to serve the purposes of the settlor, or whether they are excessive. 113 Two options face the drafter. First, he can say nothing and simply
rely on the act to grant the necessary powers, or second, he
can rely on the act partially, negating 4some provisions and
adding others to cover shortcomings.1
Some of the changes that might be made have already
been mentioned and include raising the standard of prudence
required of extraordinarily skilled trustees, requiring earmarking and limiting the trustee's power to set his own compensation. Others, suggested by commentators include
granting powers which would make it easier for trustees to
run sole-proprietorships."I Another point, mentioned before,
but worth restating, is that the provisions of the act can be
incorporated by reference into instruments which are not
covered by the act."' Besides wills, such instruments could
include business agreements and escrow arrangements. In
these cases the act can especially be of use because the
drafter can simply incorporate those phrases which are
necessary to give the desired result without any worry of excluding a provision which is felt to be nonexcludible in trust
instruments, such as section 7.
CONCLUSION

The UTPA is a very effective instrument in modern
trust law. Its changes provide the means for the flexible
112.
113.

114.
115.
116.

Haskell, supra note 1, at 180.
supra note 78, at 237.
Note, Utah's Trustees Powers Prouisions, supra note 4, at 288-9.
SCHAFFER, supra note 78, at 237.
WYo. STAT. § 4-8-102tb) (1977).
SCHAFFER,
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management of a twentieth century trust. Several changes
in particular are most helpful. They include the broad grant
of the power of sale, the grant of the power to give and take
options, the grant of the power to lease beyond the terms of
the trust and the grant of the power to continue or participate in the operation of a business.
It is the element of flexibility, however, which has
generated the greatest criticism. Because the standard of
prudence is too low for corporate fiduciaries, because selfdealing is allowed and because delegation is treated too easily some have recommended the act not be passed." 7 It
seems, however, that such criticisms may go too far.
These problems just mentioned can be corrected by the
settlor or his counsel in the drafting of the instrument. The
act itself recognizes that it is not a cure-all for every trust by
allowing for variations. Also, the commentators seem to fail
to realize that corporate fiduciaries, while not totally above
reproach, are well regulated by federal and state government; a factor which, to a certain extent, will limit abusive
practices possible under the act.
A final statement in favor of the act is that it solves
some of the problems which occurred because a needed power was omitted. Since, under the common law, all powers had
to be expressly or impliedly granted, if one was missed the
trustee was forced to get court approval to act. He may even
have wanted the approval of the court when he acted under
the implied powers for fear that such powers might later be
found not to exist. The act solves this problem by making a
wide range of powers part of every trust. Not only does this
help the trustee, but it also reduces the strain on courts and
additionally helps the beneficiary by seeing that the administration of the trust runs smoothly.
This is not to say the act is perfect. Adoption of a prudent man rule similar to that of Utah's is strongly recommended. But, although the act has been adopted by some ten
states and in force for as long as 15 years, the litigation has
been minimal. This would seem to speak favorably for it.
JAMES L. HUEMOELLER
117.

Haskell, supra note 1, at 183.
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